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1.  INTRODUCTION 
· In:  a declaration on the  operation of the cotton aid scheme adopted at the Council 
. meeting of Jime 1997, the Council, at the request of the -Gr~ek delegatimi, .asked the 
Commission to submit a report on aid  arrangements in, the cotton sector by the end of 
the year, with special reference to the four.suggestionsput forward by Greece, which . 
. involved:  ·  . .  ·  ·  ·  ·  - · 
direct  payment of  Community aid to p~~ducers, 
regionali~ation of  penalties, 
basing the payment of advances  on estimated .  production  incrdtsed by a  safety 
margin of7;5% ·  ·  ·  ·  .  . 
legal provision for revising production estimates· in the course of 'the  marketing  . 
. year.· 
It should be made quite clear that' this report has been drawn up solely in response to 
that  request;  it  does  not  in  any  way  replace  the  report  provided .for  in  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1553/95 ori the system of  aid 'for cotton, which is to be sent to the 
Council  and  the  European  Parliament ·before  the  beginning  of the  1999/2000 
marketing year. 
Consequently, this report drafted at the request of the Greek delegation cannot be 
regarded as ari investigation of,the economy of  the sector in gene,ral. It consists in an 
in-depth  examination·  of  the  four  suggestions,.  with  their . advantages  and 
disadvantages, on the assumption that an· the other detailed a.ITangem~nts for the aid 
scheme remain unchanged. This investigation is.not ·at this stage accompanied by any 
. proposal for changes to  ·legislation~  ·  · · 
Th~  suggestions for changes have be~n  assessed in the·Iight of  the need to maintain or~ 
if possible,  reinforce  control  measures  and  their .  effectiveness,.  in.  response  to · 
observationS made earlier by the Court of .Auditors in its annual.reports. I  The Court 
noted serious weaknesses in the. control aspects of the CMO for cotton, and pointed 
out that  both the  Council  and Parliament  had  urged  the .  Commission to  see. that 
effectiv~ control measures were introduced. 
~  '.. . .  .·  •·  ..  ..· 
2.  THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
The Greek delegation'.s  suggestio~s relate specifically to the ident~ty of the recipient 
of  aid, the stabilising mecharusm, and, for the last two points, the ·system of advance 
payment of grants and consequently also· the system of  payment. of the· balance. The 
present situation can be suinmarised as follows.  . 
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2.1  Aid scheme and prices 
Cotton does  no.t  appear in Annex  II  to  the Treaty,  but Protocol  4  to  the  Act  of 
Accession of Oreece explicitly recognises the  specifically agricultural  character of 
cotton production and introduces  produc~on aid. It was subsequently amerided and 
expandedby Protocol14 to the Act of  Accession of  Spain and PortugaL 
.  . 
One of the essential structures of the arrangements for aid to cotton is based on· the 
well-~own ''deficiency payment" system.  Aid  equal  to  the  difference  between a 
guide·price fixed by the Council and a world market price determined at least once a 
month  by. the · Commission  is  granted  to  gioaing  firms;  which  are  required  in 
exchange to pay a minim  inn price to producers. Thus w4ile the purpose of  the aid is to 
provide income support for producers, its operation is based on payments to ginners  . 
. Moreover,. the· aid·  is  granted for  quantities  of unginned  cotton,  although ·these 
quantities are adjusted as a function of  the fibre yield of  ginnning. 
The guide price and the. minimum price for wiginned cotton of standard quality have 
been fixed,  for a period ending with the 1999/2000 Il)arketing year at the latest, at 
ECU 106·30/100 kg and ECU 100·99/100 kg respectively.  these institutional prices 
relate to  relat~ to cotton of fair,  sound and merchantable quality,  having a  10  % 
moisture  content  and  3  %  impurity  content  and  the . necessary  characteristics  to 
produce, after giniling, 32 % grade 5 fibres  (white middling) of 28 mm length (1-
3/32~).  ·.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
The marketing .year runs from 1 September to 31 ,Auglli;t. 
2.2  Stablliser mechanism 
In March 1995 the Cominission, acting upon its undertaking at the December·l993 
Council meeting "to reflect on the specific problems o.f the cotton sector in a spirit of 
fair management", sent the Council a comprehensive report on the operation of  the aid 
system, and in particular the stabiliser mechanism.  - · 
In order to solve the problems linked to  the fact· that increased production in one 
producer Member State led· to identical penalties in both, the Council introduced a 
system of guaranteed national quantities (GNQs) from  the  1995/96 ·marketing year 
onwards, with the aim of  making sure that producers in each Member State take step·s 
to  respond  to  overshoots  themselves.  To  offset  this,  the  abatement  cut-off was 
removed,  as  was· the possibility of carrying over part of the  abatement  from  one 
marketing year to the next.' 
For an ab~ement.to  be applied, two conditions ~ust  be met: 
II. 
actual  .  Community  production  must  exceed  the  guaranteed  maximum 
quantity (GMQ) of  1_031 000 toniles; 
this  Community  production  must  include  actual  production  in  Spain 
exceeding the GNQ of 249 000 tonnes; or in Greece exceeding the GNQ of  . 
782 000 tonnes. 
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l\4oreover, when the abatement is applied to only one Member State, it is based, not 
.on that Memb~r  State) overshoot ofits own GNQ, but on the Community overshoot 
ofGMQ.  ·· ·  . 
The abatement involves reducing tlie 'iJlide price by a percentage equal to half of that 
by which the-reference qliantity_is exceeded·. 
2.3  Advance payments and balances 
One of the ·  aiiris of the reform introduced from the 1995/96 marketing· year was to 
. apply  penalties. in .  a  .  single  marketing·  year  to  the  producers  responsible  for 
overshooting in that year. It  was therefore essential to provide for a  system of  payment 
to combine advance payments on grants m  the course.of the year and settlement of  the. 
bafance at the end· of  the same year. 
2.3.1  Advances 
Calculation of  ad\Tances 
Before the beginning of the marketing year, the Commission, in accordance with the 
Management  Committee  procedure,  estimates  production for  each  Member  State 
concerned. In view of  Council Regulation (EC) No 1554/95 laying down the general  .  .  . 
rules for the sy~tem of  aid for cotton, the estimated levels of  production are increased 
by a rlS% safety margin for the calculation of  a -provisional abatement, through the 
theoretical operation of  the stabilisers.  ·  ·  ·  · 
.  .  .  . 
Depending on the vanable levels of m~ket.  prices,  the  amounts  ~f-the. advances 
granted in.the course of  the marketing year result  from the following  calculation:  .  .  '  .  .  '  .  .  .  .  .  ' 
Guide price .  .  . 
-. }>rovisional abatement 
- ~  orld price ·  ,  :· 
',:  . .  ; ; .'. 
-~-. 
•'  _____________  ;.  _____  _._~.,:.  ___ ·;.  : 
.  ·. 
=Advance-
. As the present system provides for production to be estimated once only, provisional. 
·abatements  are  constant  thrOughout  the  marketing ·year,  but different _as  between . 
Member States, depending ·on how far each· has overshot its own GNQ. Consequently, 
,  .  .  .  I  . 
for the same world price, the .advance may not be the same in both Member States.  .  .  . 
.Th~·  \3%·-ifi~rwc in  c'Slimtl~ production provides a safety  net to ensur-e  that hy  th~. 
end  of the  year  the  advances  granted  do ·not  exceed  the  aid  finally· due.  This· 
percentage was fixed, from the second year of  application of the reform ( 1996/97) in · 
the  light· of past  figures  for  the  previous.  nine  marketing· years,· relating  to  the 
. discrepancy observed betw~en production forecasts before the begiiming· of the .year 
and actual output recorded at the end (see Aruiex 1). The figures show that a margin of 
·IS% is neither arbitrary rior excessive.  .  . 
'  .  . 
How the system of  advanCes o.perates 
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AS  soon as the -ungi~ed cotton enters the giiming plant (is  taken ·into  supe~ised_ · 
storage) and from  16  October followina the heainnina of the marketing  year.  the 
Member States Will,  on application from  the ginnerS,  grant an  ~vance on aid  on  · 
.  condition security .of at least 110% of  the amount of  the advance is lodged. When the 
cotton is taken into supervised storage, the ginner can indicate. that the aid on which 
the advance is to be granted corresponds to that for the ~y  of entry into supervised 
storage (subsidy of the-day) or to that for a ·tater date (post-fixing). The security is 
forfeit up to an amount equal to that by which the advanc~ exceeds the aid eventually 
granted.  ·  .· 
· The ginning period during which quantities_ of unginned cotton can be taken  into 
supervised  storage  and  weighed  ends  on  31  March.  However,  from  the  present 
marketing year (1997/98), the Member State has the option of  setting an earlier date if 
this does not interfere \Vith  commercial operations  in the· sector.  In that  case, the 
Member State adopts tl:te  new time limit at the latest 30 days before it comes into 
force, and informs the Commission thereof immediately. 
The .  monthly  breakdown  of quantities  taken  into  supervised  storage  iri  recent 
marketing years will be found in Annex II.  Two points should be borne in mind: it 
.takes longer in Greece than in Spain to  dispos~ of the harvest, and the most active 
period  is  usually  in  October  and  November.  On  average,  quantities  take~ into 
supervised storage up till the end of October and the end of November respeetiveiy 
re:Present, as a percentage of  the total quantity for .the period as a whole, 43% and 66% 
in Greece, and 77% and 96% in Spam. 
The period during which operators can apply for advances. on aid also ends on 31 
M~h  but unlike the ginlllng period it  cannot be shortene<f by  the Member States. 
2.3.2  Balance. 
·.  . At the end of  the marketing year, the level of  the futal abatement applicable to' each 
Member State is determined on the basis of each Member State's fipal  production, 
established at the latest before the end of  June.  · 
·:·:For each. period for which a worid IWillcet price for unginned cotton has been f!xed, 
aid is calculated as follows: 
·  Guide price 
-Final rethlction in guide price (final abatement) 
- World price  ·  · 
~---------
=Aid 
However, tM amo\lllts of  aid thus calculated can be increased, J)W'SU311t to Article 2(4) 
of Councif Regulation (EC) No 1553/95, if the following  thr~e col'lditions are met at· 
·.  the end of  the marketing year: 
ihe weighted  average of the wo!ld market price  is  greater than  ECU 30.2 .·per · 
-lOOkg 
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total budgetary expenditure is les8 than ECU 770.niillion,' 
.  .  '  - ..  .  . 
actilalproduction in the Member Stat~ exceeds its GNQ.
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Defiiritive amounts-of aid are therefore obtained as follows: 
Aid· 
+ Increase in aid 
.:...---"'!"'.--.--------------
· =Definitive amount of  aid •·· 
The balance to be paid· to ginrter8 at the end of  tJie J:mirketir{g year- thus corresponds to 
'the difference between the level of  .definitive aid and the amount of advances.  The· 
balance is·  differen~ as· be~een  the Member States,- but is in fact  ~onstant throughout  . 
the marketing year,  and does not depend 'on the period for which a level of world. 
pnces has been fixed. It can be obtained as follows:  · ··  ·  .. 
·Definitive abatement· 
- Provisional abatement  · 
+  Increase in aid 
The l;>alances  paid in the 1996/97 marketing year following  full  application of the 
mechanism described above were as follows: 
· .ECU 32.315/lOQ,kg_~'Gt:eece;, 
. ·ECU0.744  '/100 kg fuSpairi  .. 
.{  . - ~. . 
.,., 
·Consequently, the balarice paid to  Greek  gillners was  significant,  corresponding to. 
aboufSO% ofthe aid due, because actrial output in Greece was considerably less than 
originally forecast(;.24%).  The balance paid to·Sparush ginners, on the other hand, 
was quite small,'because actual output in Spain was l3,6%.higher than forecast,  a 
. figure very dose to the 15%safetfmargin app.liedtoforyvard estimates of  production. 
2.4· · ·  · Actors in  -the cotton sector 
The main actors involved in the agricultural production of  cotton in the strict sen~e  ·are 
-~the producer  organisations  and  the  ginning  firms.  A  brief survey 'of .these  two  , 
·categories  is  sufficient  for  present  purposes,  leaving  aside  the  description  of the 
textiles inc\~  downstream.  -~Iy·spinners  and:wea":ers.  ·  · 
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The increase may not raise.  aid above the level of  the two ceilings specified in 
· · .·  -the aforesaid Regulation, i.e. aid without the application of the abatement and 
. . aid resulting from  an increase in  th~ GNQs/  (270 000  tonnes  for  Spain and 
850000tonnesforGreece):  · .....  ·.  ·  ·  ' 
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· During the 19S0s, the CommWnty encouraged the fomiation of  producer. groUps in the 
cotton sector. Start-up aid and investment ai<l :was provided, mainly for the purchase 
ofharve8ting machinery.· .:  ·  - . - ·  -~- -··· ·  -·  ·  ·  · 
At present, •  hm-Vesting  machines· are :generally available, -in both Greece and Spain. 
PrOducer groups still have the job of mari.aging this stock. of equipment; but they nd 
~longer seem  VerY  actiVe  ·m  terms. of concentration·- and  adjustment of S_Upply  by 
producers~ However,it must be  ~ognised  that these functions can be fulfilled by the· 
jndustry dowitstreaqt (co-operatives and others).  In Spain, producer groups  are not 
very highly organised, ari:d indeed only involve 12% of  producers'~ 
i  .  '  ,,  .  .  '  .  '  '  .  . 
· 2.4.2::  Ginningftrins  · 
. · In ,Greece, of  a_ t~tal of some· ~0 firms,  co~operatives rq)rese~t abo~t a third of the 
.• niunber and 40% ofginning capacity at present. There is- no particular problem in the 
- sector as a whole, iri view of  the ,level of  total output. · 
In Spmn, co-operatives also represent about a third of the total of eighteen firms. In · 
the_ sector as a whole, there 1s some spare gi~g  cap~ity  i~ relation to the supply -of 
cotton, especially in recent years (1993/94 to. 1995/96), when per-Sistent drought was a 
major factor in limiting supply. However, if.the increase in areas sown recorded in,  _ 
1996/97 and ,1997/98  continueS,  th~  are_  groun~ for hoping :for a  .better balance  -
be~een  supply and<leniand.·  ·  ·  ·  ~- · 
2.4.3-- _-_  Financial relatio~ between ginners and  producers>·  - '  .  '  . 
Aid is granted_ only to ginning firms  applying for it,  and having lodged a c,ontract 
providing for 'payment  to the producer of a·  price at  least  equal  to  the -minimum 
institutional price. Among other things, the contract must include a clause providing 
that, should the abatement and aid in,crease mechanisms_ be applied, the a~eed price 
· Will be adjusted as  ~- function of  the effect. of the two· mechanisms·  oil the aide finally 
granted.  .  .  - -. 
When unginned ·  qott~n i~ taken into _supervised· stornge,. the. ginner mak~s.  an initial 
payment -to  the.  producer,  t3.king  account,  of course,  of the  advances  received. 
Conseciuendy~  . where  prices ·are. concerned,  the  ginners  pass  on to . producers  the 
bur4en of uncertainty about the aid that will  finally  be -granted  at the .  end of the 
marketing year.  Once they have collected the  balance at  the end 'of the year,  the .. 
ginners make the second payment to  the producers, which should -enable' them jo 
ensure an overall payn}ent corresponding to the minimum price, as provided for in  the ... 
iules·.  ·  ·  ·  .  ·  ·  ·  - .  · 
This two-stage payment of producers is a prec;;iutionary measure foLthe .ginners: If 
· they were to make a single payment, it might turn out at the end of the year to have · · 
been too high, but i_t would probably_ be difficult to  recover _the  overpayment. At the 
-same time, the advances on aid that exceeded the amount ofaid finally due would be 
. reeovered from the 110% secuiity. Moreover, it shQuld  ~e  n~ted that for the period 
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fi:om·t 'September to 15 October unginned cotton taken irito supervised storage cannot 
immediately qualify for an advance. 
.  .  . 
The  system .  of paying  Community  grants  to  ginners  in  two  stages,  an  advance  .  . 
followed by the balance, has not ha:d the same effect on behaviour in.the cotton sector· 
in the two Member Stat~s.  .  .  ·  .  . 
.  .. 
In  Greece,  -ginners  have  in  faCt  paid  producers  in  two  stages;  the  producers, 
dissatisfied with the first payment, have held on to the harvest of  uriginned cotton in· 
. the hope ofbetter prices later in'the year. This has affected the disposal of  the harvest, 
and thus the rate' at which cotton is taken into .supervised storage. Consequently, the 
period of  ginning in the st#ct serise has also been affected.  . 
In Spain, the situation is different in. view  of the surplus  capa~ity in the  girlliing 
industry  in  relation  to  the  supply  frotri  producers.· Against  a  l;>ackground  of 
. competition,  the  ·ginners  made  a  single  paynient  to  producers,. for' the  .1996/97  · 
marketing year at all events, which later tunied out to.be much higher than the·final . 
. minimum price  .. 
'1•,  •• 
3.  DIRECT PAYMENT TO PRODUCERS 
3.1  Greece's request and the reasons behind it 
·~ 
While maintaining the principle of deficiency payments,  ~d.  the.· grant of aid on the  · 
. . basis .  of the quantity produc.ed,  Greece would like "to  see the aid paid direct to  the 
producers through the agency of producer groups, of which there are very few  at 
present, but .which could number about 300 to 400 to cover total output. 
. With such new ~angements  for granting Community financing, which already exist 
for certain CMOs such as tobacco, the principle.ofthe mi,nimum price for producers 
. c.ouldbe maintained,, this price being paid by the groups .. 
Besides collecting Community aid. and paying member producers the minimum price, 
the producer groups would· choose one of the  following  alternatives  for  marketing 
~re.  .  .  . 
a)  Marketing by producer groups 
.  . 
Under this alternative, producer groups would own the fibre and would therefore be· 
responsible for marketing it.  In this situation, the groups could own ginning plants 
.  (possibly setting up a co-operative) or lease plant from the ginners, or subcontract the ' 
ginning of the cotton on -their own accoUnt.  .  .  . 
Iri the last two cases, the consideration paid to the ginners by th,e  producer groups 
~ould  consist either in a flat-rate amount applied to the quantity ginned (similar to  a. 
jobbing contract) or in a financial sum to cQver the hire ofthe.ginning plant.  .  .  ~·  .  ' 
.  .  . 
This alternative would considerably weaken the importance of private  ginne~s, who 
. would become merely intermediaries with no commercial function. As for .individual 
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produ~ers, thejr situation would be unchanged. In the short term, the Greek authorities 
consider that  this  alternative  could  concern  40% of total  production  through  the 
·intermediary of  co:..operatives. J:hat is_ the reason for suggestmg the second alternative. 
.  '  '  '  .  ~.  . .  ·..  .  - ' 
B)  Marketing br- ginners 
Under_ this alternative, the ginners own the fibre and remain responsible for marketing 
it,· as in the present situation. However, instead of paying the minimum price, as  at 
present,  they  would  undertake  to  pay  the·  producer  organisations  an  amount 
corresponding to the difference between ihe minimum price and the. aid.  The Greek 
. authorities would like this to be laid down as a legal requirement in a Community 
regulation. 
.  .  . 
One of  the effects of  changing the recipient of  the aid would be to weaken the position 
of  the ginning firms against the producers when negotiating contracts and prices. The 
Greek authorities.would like to see a two-stage process, where alternatives (a) and (b) 
·would co-exist in the first  s~age; until eventually all output could be absorbed under 
alternative (a), whereupon alternative (b) ~ould  be.withdrawn. 
3.2  Analysis of  the proposed changes 
Marketing of  the fibre by the producer groups should lead to the fqllowing advantages 
for producers:  .  · 
-,  it woUld provide an incentive to improve the structures of  producer groups; 
-.·producers who are direct r~ipients of aid Should feel more responsibility for the 
level  of  total output, and thus for the penalties for overshooting the GNQ;  . 
direct payment of  the Community grant without going through t4e ginners could 
speed up payment of  the minimum price to producers; 
any profits from managing the aid could be passed on by the producer groups to 
their members. · 
However, if  producer groups are to market fibre, they will have to take responsibility 
for applying not only for supervised sto_rage, but also, and especially, for advances and 
for rud, which means dealing with post-fixing, since they will be the recipients of  the 
aid. Moreover, the groups wi~l8lso be subject to the constraint.of-Iodging security for 
the advanc~  they collect. 
.  . 
The  problems  of managing  applications  for  Slq>ervised  storage  are  exclusively 
practical  matter~ of iulministration  or shortage  of Infrastructure  for. weighing  the 
cotton. However, the management of advances and aid (especially post-fixing) is  a 
· sensitive matter, since it requires not only a good knowledge of  the_ world market but 
also,  in  certain  cases,  correct  anticipation  of world  prices.  To  lodge· security, 
moreover, bank facilities are requirect. The structure of  producer groups in Greece and 
especially in Spain does_ not seem suitable, as they operate at present, to enable most 
of  them to deal with these problems and constraints iv  t~1~' ner-,r future. 
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·These  arrangements  would  mean  that  production  of un~iimed cotton  would  be 
. momtored by the producer groups, since it is at this stage that cotton would be taken 
into supel'Vised storage: there would then be 300 to 400 checkpoints, instead of only 
90 at present. However,  ~jrined cotton would need tope checked at the ginning stage, 
and this check on the quantity of  fibres would remain essential sinc.e the aid is granted  ~ 
· . for unginned cotton taken into supervised storage, adjusted for the  fibre  yield  fro~ 
ginning.  Except for the producer groups constituted as  ginning co-operatives,  these 
twofold  checks· at ·two· different  stages  of processing  would  cle~ly- be  more 
complicated than the present system. 
·If  the producer groups were to market the ginnedcottoil (alternative (a)), they would 
be responsible for negotiating sates' co~tracts for their fibr~ on the world market, and 
thus for finding potential customers. 
If_ the. combination  and  .ad4ition  of the  two  mechanisms (applying  for  aid  and 
negotiating fibre sales contracts on the world market) did not result in a price equal to 
95% of  the guide price, the producer groups would be unaple to pay the1rJnembersthe 
minimum price, without endangering their financial viability .. 
If  the giriners were to retain responsibility for marketing the fibre on the world market 
(alternative (b)), it seems inconsistent to ·grant to producer groups aid that depends 
closely on fluctuations ofwor~d  prices, which the producer groups do not have to cope 
with.  .  . 
Moreover, this alternative would invo\ve  including  a requirement ina-Community. 
regulation for the ginner to pay the producer group a certain price, corresponding to  -
the difference between the minimum price and the aid. This would mean i~posing a 
financial constraint on an operator that did not receive a Community gt;ant. From a 
legai  point of view,  this  requirement  cmild  be  imposed  provided  the  ginner  still 
remained involved in the operation of  the aid scheme  .. 
The ginning process wouid. still be a necessary condition for the granting of aid,  sine~· 
the quantity of  unginned cotton eligible for aid would still be :determined as. a  fup.ction 
of  the fibre yield of ginning. Moreover, the gilmer would still have the possibility of· 
purchasing unginned Community cotton at a price close to  the W()rld  nl.arket  pric~. 
which would not be  possible without a Community aid scheme.  .. 
From a· practical point of view, however, this requirement would encounter a majo'r 
problem,  since the. differet!ce  between the mininium price  and, the  amount  of aid · 
varies throughout the n;1aiketing year. Consequently, the ginners would have to make 
continual adjustments to  the price paid to  the producer  gr~ups, which ·seems very: 
complicated, especially when aid is post-fixed. 
To determine the yield of ginning in such a  system, the fibre produced -by the gi:rlners 
<5  would have  to  be  mon~tored. For the  same  :reasons  as  those  mentioned  above  in 
u..i  connection with financial constraints, there is no obstacle from the legal point of  view 
~.  . to imposing such monitoring on an op~ator  that_doe_s not recei~e a Cominunity gnint. 
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Under- such a system, it is difficult to ensure monitoring or to  hnpose penalties in 
·cases of  failure to comply with Community regulations. One idea might be to provide 
for national sanctions, or' the introduction of a principle of approval of firms,  which 
would then entail the possibility of  withdrawing approval. 
Against a background of  monitoring and sanctions, ginners could turn to the purchase 
of  raw unginned cotton from outside the Community. 
3.3  Conclusions 
In the light of  the arguments, alternative (a), involving marketing of  ginned cotton by 
the producer groups, could be advisable in some cases, hut alternative (b) does not 
seem feasible. 
. Some producer groups set up as ginning co-operatives receive aid under the present 
arrangements m  the way described as option (a) in that, as part. of the co-operative  . 
sector, they market the fibre at present. In this capacity, the co-operative receives the 
· aid, and consequently passes the minimum price on to its members. 
However, it is unlikely that all the producer groups (and especially those still to be set 
up) will have adequate expertise to inanage not only the system of applications for 
superVised  stora~e, but also that of applications for advances and aid, and the actuaJ. 
sale of fibre on the world market. Not all producer groups will be able to join the 
alternative (a) scheme fully and immediately; ·some may reach a sufficient degree of· 
organisation, but there is a  risk that for others the.financial attractions of  being a dl.rect 
.  recipient of  aid m~y  take precedence ovet the estabiishment of  adequate and efficient 
i:ri.frastructure. 
I 
In Spain, the present low percentage of  producers who are members of  groups would 
also be a handicap for the· establishment of this. two-fold structure favoured. by the 
Greek authorities. 
On balance, it·is suggested that the present arrangements for channelling-aid through 
ginning undertakings as provided for in Protocol4 should be maintained, to facilitate 
management and monitoring of the scheme. In this framework, Article 7 of Council . 
Regulation (EC) No 1554/95 could be adapted. This. Article provides at present that 
where a cotton ginning undemiking carries out ginning on behalf of an  individual 
producer or a group of producers it must submit a  statement giving details of  the 
conditions under which the ginning is carried out and how the aid is passed on to the 
. producers. The reference is to aid, not to the- minimum price. The new Cou.llcil rules 
could specify that, where aid is passed on to a producer group, that group must pay 
individual producers the mit:rimum price to-ensure compliance with the requirements 
for minimum prices referred to in the Protocol. 
When the general operation of  the cotton aid scbeme is reviewed_ at a later stage, with _ 
. the possibility of more substantial  changes than those under consideration  in  this 
report, one option to cor..sider will be that of fixed aid (per hectare or per tonne) paid 
direct to the. producer without  6Cir.:g  through the intermediary of the groups.  This 
option in the form in Of':;;:.·;-.tion at p:e'.::err.t  i:o.  the tobacco and oliveoil sectors wcuki 
<.  ' .) 
elitnjnate_ the  concept  of minimum  price,. and  all  the  problems  related  to  the 
management 'of  applications for aid, especially post-fixed aid. However, it might make 
producers' incomes highly variable, b_ecause of  the volatility ofthe world p~icc  . 
.  '  <: 
4.  REGIONALISA  TION OF PENALTIES 
4.1  Greece's request and the reasons behind it 
Initially, ~Greece bad asked  for provision  for  sharing  out  the  present  guaranteed 
riational9uantity between the various producer regions. 
.  .  . 
Greece also wanted a clause siinilar to that granted to Genrtany in .the  fram~work of 
arrailgenients  for oilseed crops,. where the sanction applicable at national  leyel  and 
. resulting from the stabiliser mechanism can be adjusted,_ at the request of  the Member 
. State_concerned, to individual regions~  . 
The purpose  was  to ·allow  differentiated  regional penalties  as  lol)g  as  they  were · · 
. weighted to correspond to the ov~rall national penalty. In this way, producers outside 
.the traditional regions of  production can be discouraged, while thos~ in the traditional 
regions, where major investment has been made in the past, can be supported. Another . 
. purpose  was  to  encourage  the  rotation  of crops,  and  thus  better  environmental 
management ofwater reserves and better soil coris~rvation. 
As :this  first  option  could lead  to  major  penalties·. for ·certain  regions,· the  Greek 
authorities substantially changed .their demands, and.  are now asking for  individual 
production quptas to be fiXed for each producer.  · 
.  . 
· Under these 1_1ew  arrangements; production equivalent tO the quota would be eligible 
for full aid, ·without any sanction, whil,e production above the quota would receive no 
aid and would-be remunerated on the free market. 
. Individual quotas  would be fixed  iri the light of various cnteria such  as  the  area· 
covered and the level of  regional investment. They would be rev~sed annually. 
Logically, the sum of  individual quotas should correspond -to the guaranteed national 
quantity  allocated to  Greece  at  present  (782 000  tonnes).  The  Greek  _authorities 
. consider that this _quantity ·should be  ·increased, however. 
4.2  Analysis of the proposed· changes 
'  ~  .  . .  .  -·  ·' 
4.2.1  Original proposal  . 
If  Greece's total GNQ  were to be allocated between the regions, this would mean, as a ' 
function of the extent of overshoot, varying levels of abatement from one region to 
0  . ·  another, vaiying levels of  aid, and consequently varying levels of minim·um ·prices. It 
u.i  would therefore be essential to  provide  for  different  levels  of advances  on  grants 
.  ~  depending on forward estimates of  production:  . 
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There  would  need  to  be  a  regional  breakdown  of the  budgetary  redistribution 
~ · mechanism that operates when expenditure is below. ECU  _770 million._ 
These constraints would make the aid scheme cinnplicated to manage.  The reason 
they exist is that regional references relate to  levels of output rather than to  area. 
Moreover, a system of  regional allocation as a function of  levels· of  output might lead 
to transfers of  production from one region to another. 
"" ~  . 
4.2.2  N:w proposal 
A -system of individual quotas involves the same risk of transfer of production, but 
between produc~·  rather than between regions. Moreover, problems similar to those 
besetting .  mi~ quotas .  or durum wheat quotas  would probably arise:  cumbersome 
management for individuals, and complex control procedures. 
The aid scheme for durum wheat provided for individual entitlement related to area. 
Because ·of the major problems in applying the arrangements, the Council recently 
decided to repeal·the system of  individual entitlement by area, and to replace it with a 
system based on a guaranteed nia.ximum area (GMA). 
The problem of  consistency arises when quotas are applied to individual producers but 
aid is granted to producer groups; the problem of  controls also arises, in view of the 
clear risk of transfer of production between produeers in the same group,  or even- · 
between groups;  ·  ·  ·  · 
· Annual reviews of  individual quotas on the basis of allocation criteria that-are not, at 
this stage, very clearly defined only add a further complication. 
Individual· allocation of production  would  mean having  two  categories  of cotton: 
grant-aided cotton and non-grant-aided c<;>tton,  at the level of  the producer and at the· 
.level of the ginner._ It would not be easy to monitor the system, and each operator 
would need to keep separate accounts for the two categories ofcotton. Moreover, the 
present system of adjusting quantities of eligible unginned cotton up or down as  a 
function of the fibre yield of ginning would no longer be efficient in certain cases, 
since the upward adjustm'ent could not be applied when it Jed to a quantity in excess 
·of  the quota granted.  ·  · 
These arr_angements with two categories of cottoit. one eligible for  full  aid with no 
sanction,  and  the other without any  aid,  also  imply a  considerable  change  in  the 
scheme,  since  it  would no -longer be necessary  to  estimate  production or to  pay 
advances .and balances. 
4.3  Conclusions 
-
The initial option involving regional allocation of  the GNQ leads to complications in 
the management  and  control of the  aid  scheme.  It would  inevitably  give  rise  to 
differing levels of  support and remuneration from one region to another. It might also 
lead to the transfer of  production between regioris. 
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In the light of the arguinents set out above, the option of individual. quotas allocated 
annually can be rejected  completely;  it  would increase the  complexity of control 
ineasirr~s. thus  weakening  their  effectiveness,  against the  wishes  of the  Court. of 
Auditors, the Council and Parliament.  ·  · 
. A simpler way of  avoiding the expansion: of  cotton-growing throughout Greec~  co~ld . 
b~  partially.based on the present model fordurum wheat. Thiswould involve defining. 
areas of  traditionalproduction, where the aid· scheme would be fully  applicabl~, and 
·other areas where no· support :would be P,rovided.  · 
If such a scheme were to be adopted, it should be based 'o~  ··strict~r controls of  area~· 
sown to cotton and of area declarations accompanying the cotton supplied to ginning ·  · 
undertakings~ Complications would  therefore  b.e  introduced ·whatever solution  was  · 
adopted. The introduction of  these provisions would mean adjusting the.basic rules.  .  -
To allow some regionalisation while avojding. the  undesir~ble transfer of production _ 
betweeri  regions,  the  solution  would  be  to  adapt  support. as  a. function  of area. 
However;  this  alternative  does  not ·correspond  to  the  m:odel:  which .·the  Greek 
authorities would  like;  ~oreover~ it  ~annot be  adopted  without changing the basic 
principle_s of  the present scheme.  ·  · 
In Spain,-the concept of regionalisation of penalties clearly does· not have tpe ·same: 
·implications,  since  Spanish cotton· production is  concentrated 'in Andalusia; 'which 
·  usua.J.ly~.acCOl.llltS for 95% of  output.  .  . "'  . 
S~  . ESTIMATED PRODUCTION  . 
.  .  . 
jhe  Greek . authorities  take  the  vi~w:  with .. reason,  that  their·  third  and.  fourth 
suggestions are no longer: relevant in view oftheir new request for. regionalisation of 
sanctions  (i~dividual quotas). This i; because the abatement and consequent s~~tion  · 
would no longer apply, which would preclude the need to estimate production as  a . 
basis for calculating actvahces; 
- .  .  .  _·.  ·_  \ 
. We  do  nevertheless  consider the  last  two  pointS,- which  are  difficult to  dear with 
· .  s~arately,  _since they relate to the detailed rul~~  ·for· paying advances.  · · 
5.1 . . . · Greece's request and th~ reasons behind it. 
. '-. 
Greece~s original .  suggestion was  to  all~W  .more·. flexibility· in  the two parameters.' 
influencing the ca]culiltion of advances. This involved providing -a  legal  framework 
. for  revi~ing ,the  estiinated production in the  co~se of the  year,  and  reducing  the 
percentage for the safety margin added to ·estimated production. from 15.% to 7  ;5 %. .  . 
Greece  sugg~ted revising the production estimates·. at ·the latest during the  last. ten 
days- of  October,  with  the  possibility,  where  necessary,  of revising  the  figures-
upwards .. 
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Th~main  putpose is to obtain, during the course ofthe marketing year, an  estim~te as 
Close !:18 possible to actual final output, so as to grant aid recipients prior remuneration 
as close as possible to theirdefinitive entitlem~t.·  . 
5.2  -.  Analysis of  th~ proposed changes 
· Revising  estiniates  of production  during  the  cour8e  of the  year  (if it  revises  the 
·original  ·figures ·-downwards)  and  applying ·a  smaller  ll1argin  of safety  (7.5%)  .. 
contributes  to reducing  the  difference  between  the  provisional  and  the. definitive 
abatement. Advances  are  thus  larger in the ·course -of the  marketing  year,  and  the 
balance to be pai~ at-the end is smaller. 
Tin~ means that recipients of  advances can pass on the paymen~ of  the minimum price 
to  producers  more  rapidly,  espeeially  if the 'recipients. are  producer  groups,  as 
suggested by the Greek autJ1oriti~s. 
.  .  .  '  .  •' 
However, lfthe safety margin added to the first estimation, ~ade  before the beginning 
of  the year, Js only 7  .5%,' the budgetary risk is appreciable, since the advances granted 
· nright turn out to be high~r  than aid fmally due,  ·  · 
. ·  clliming activity-is in'full swing by the. end.ofOctober, an9 revised estimates of final 
. production·would still be fairly unreliable~ A safety margin of. only 7.5% would entaiL 
· an  unacceptable budgetary risk.  The  15%· margin should be retained,  even  for  the 
~evisedest4nate, which would reduce the impa.Ct ofthe re:vlsioit on the new adyances. 
Under these arrangements, aid recipients woulq receive: · 
from 16 October, an ad~ance linked to thtdnitial estimate p(production, increased 
by .  a safety m~gin  o't-15%. (estimate made befQre  th~.  beginning~  of the marketing 
yea::r)~- ~  r··  ·-:..  .  .  . .  .  . 
- from  early Novemt:?er,_a further advance (not much .higher) based on tJie  revised 
estimate  of production,  still  with  a 15%  safety margin  and  including  a  small 
retroactive 'component liriked to the earlier adv~ce,.: 
the. balarice·at the end ofthe marketing  year~ . 
. However, this series  of.paym~ts ofdifferent amoUntS  is a source ·of complications 
that is very likely to .lead to  .adffiinistrative errors for the· sake of what in mosr cases 
. will ~e  a very sm~l  8djnstment to ~e  advance.·  ·  · 
5.3  ·  :Conclusions 
To  reduce  the :b1.1dgetary  nsk  to  a  minimum,_ it. might  be  advisable  to  calCulate 
adv~ces  in  _two stages: 
in the first stage, the initial estimate 'of production made before the beginning of  the 
marketing year could be kept, \yiththe safety margin of 15%  ·  · 
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- in the second-stage, the estimate could be revised at the end of November, i.e. well 
into the period during' which th~  bulk of  the cotton is taken into supervised storage; . 
·· as this estimate would ~e  Itl.ore reliable, a smaller safety margin could be applied. 
By postponing the  revised .estimate of production until  the  end of November,  the 
-conditions  of remuneration  of operators  are  improved both in  Greece  and  Spain, 
without risk for  the budget. The complications resulting  from  the payment of two. 
advances still remain, however  . 
To  avoid  the  payment  of  cseveral  advances,  with  all  the  resulting  administrative 
~omplications, it would be better to pay one advance from 16 December, instead of 16 
October as _at present, on the ·basis of the estimate of production made at :the end of · 
_  November increased by a safety margin of  less than 15%.  .··  .  -
These changes would require amendtpent of.Council Reg\Ilation (EC)· No  1554/95 
laying down the general rules"for the system of  aid for cotton.  -
6.  GENERAL-CONCLUSIONS  . 
.  . 
.  '  .  -- . 
The main pwpose of this report is to enable the Council to grasp the implications of 
the four changes suggested by the Greek authorities, in relation to the present system, 
<with all. the other present arrangements for the cotton aid schem~  remaining constant. 
Other changes to the scheme might be considered with a view to involving producers 
more directly in the gi~ting of  Comm~tY.  aid. However, any such changes would be . 
·radical, implying an approach based on flat-rate aid (per hectare or per tonne); they 
would subs!antially increase the variability of  ·incomes dependent on market prices, 
· · and imply tighter controls of  the quality and quantity ofoutput. Such options could be  .. 
considered when the general- operation of  the scheme is reviewed;  a report  on the 
scheme as a whole is to be sent to th~ Council and to Parliament by 1 August 1999. 
For the granting of aid to producer groups, their present structure in both Greece and 
Spain does not .seem  likely to  enable most of them to cope immediately -with  the 
constraints that .  inevitably fall  on the recipient  of aid  in terms  of management of 
takil:tg ip.to supervised· stoiage;'adyances and aid itself.  ' 
Under. the  alternative  whc;a-e  ginners  would be responsible  for  marketing the fibre. -
-downstream ofreceipt.of aid by the producer groups, there would be a corresponding 
· obligation to ,pay a certain price to the producer group. This alternative is not to  be 
recommended,  since  it would raise problems of control  and  sanctions;  but also ·of 
consistency. in relation to the basic principle of  the deficiency payment.  -
Encouragement could be given toe the other alternative, where the  producer groups 
them~elves would be responsible for marketi~g  the fibre (in Greece this is already the 
case for producer groups set up as ginning co-operatives). There is already a rule that 
cotton  ginning  undertakings_ which  C3.rry  out  giruling on behalf of  an  individual 
·producer or'a group of  producers with them must pass aid on to  th~ producers, apd in 
that case it should be. reinforced. In order to comply with the requirements concerning,· 
mini~um prices  laid  down ·by  the  Protocol,  the  new  Council  Regulation  could. 
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introduce-an obligation for producer groups to pay a minimum price to their members  .. 
In those conditions, producer groups would avoid all  the constraints related to  the 
.  management of aid by the ginners. Moreover, producer groups carrying out ginning 
themselves would, as at present, continue to collect and manage the;: aid.  · 
The introduction,.  of a  system of individual  quotas to .maintain  cultivation -in  the 
traditional  production  areas  creates  a  number  of monitoring  and  management 
probl~s that cannot be solved in a  manner compatible with the principles ofthe 
·present  aid  scheme.  Regionalisation  of the  present  guaranteed  national · quantity 
implies  multipl~ levels of aid,  and thus the problem of controlling the  transfer of 
productionbetween regions. However, one possibility that could be considered, based 
on  the ·principle  at  present  applied  for  durum  wheat,  would  be  for  a  Council. 
Regulation to fix areas that are not traditional production areas, where the aid scheme 
would not apply. 
As to ~e  rules for the payment of  advances, an improvement in production estimates 
requires revised estimates at a time when the main period of entry into supervised 
storage is usually we_ll advanced (that is, towards the end of  November): In this case, a 
safety margin of less than 15% could be applied to the  n~vised estimate to  calculate 
the  advance  on  aid  without  creating  budgetary  risk  Moreover,  to  avoid  the 
_coexistence  of several  advances,  and  the  resulting · administrative  complications, 
postponement  for  two  months  of the  actual  payment  of advances  should  be 
considered.  These changes  involve  amending  the  general  rules  laid  down by  the 
Council. 
The conclusions of  this report can therefore besummarised a8follows:  . 
.  aid should continue to be granted to the ginning undertaking,  whe~er a private 
undertaking or an association, .and the possibilities for paying the minimum price 
·when giiming is carried out on  behalf  of  producer groups should .be made explicit; 
the introduction of  individual production quotas would not  be a good idea, but the 
possibilitY of  geographical concentration of  eligibility for aid shoul~  be considered; 
it might be possible to consider a single advance payment calculated on the basis of 
a  better ~timate of  production,_ Which eo  :old then be. mcreased by a margin Sfl?.aller 
than the present-1 5%.  ·  ·  · 
fu the light of the Council's discusE~ions of this report, the-above suggestions could 
lead  to  proposals  for  legislation  applicable  to  the  forthcoming -marketing  year 
1998/.99.  They  do· not,  in  themselves~  involve  any  extra  expenditure  for  the 
Co~unity  ~udget. -
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